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THE NAVAHO EXILE AT BOSQUE REDONDO
By CHARLES AMSDEN
the two-faced god of ancient Rome, would have
been an appropriate deity for the Navaho of the early
19th century. The tribal countenance of this time has two
markedly different aspects, and in the accounts of contemporary observers we find high praise and scathing blame
strangely intermingled. Weaving was in its most brilliant
stage, the bayeta period, and the fame of the Navaho blanket grew like young corn in summer. That was the smiling
aspect of Janus, and for it we may thank the women of the
tribu. His sinister side ,is seen when the activities of the
men are probed, and we find that while the women sat
peacefully at home ,plying spindle and batten to the evergrowing glory of their craft, the warriors were no less
intent upon a reputation in their own right. They were out
pillaging the communal lands and herds of the Pueblos and
the isolated farmsteads and small villages throughout
Spain's remote province of New Mexico.
Thus did it come about that the native resident shuddered at the very name which to the visitor from the United
States called up a pleasing image of pastoral bliss and honest industry; and if one asked a chance acquaintance for an
opinion of the Navaho, the tone of the reply would depend
gTeatly upon whether that person had just bought a blanket or lost a band of sheep. But the men managed to ravel
the tribal repute much faster than the women could spin it,
and it was generally agreed throughout the Spanish settlements of the Rio Grande valley, from Taos on the north
down to sun-baked Socorro, that the Navaho were the foremost scourge of a land that knew its scourging well.
Scarcely a chronicler of the period, from Zebulon Pike in
1807 to "EI Gringo" Davis in 1857, neglects to pause a
moment in his narrative and curse the raiding Navaho, acANUS,
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tive on a front extending from the Hopi villages of Arizona
to the Comanche country in Texas.
And just as the weavers of the period were encouraged
and stimulated by the warm reception given their vivid and
durable blankets by Mexican settler and American visitor
alike, so were the raiders favored by the political fortunes of
the time. Of the growing tension between Spanish and
Anglo-Saxon America they knew and cared Ilttle. Free as
wild antelope and simple as children, they had yet to learn
.that the world is a large place, filled with tribes of white
men who fight among themselves like tribes of Indians. So
slowly did this lesson penetrate the Navaho mind that the
new tribe known as Americans had them crushed and
utterly beaten almost before they had convinced themselves
that any serious har Il1 lay in these handfuls of ruddy-faced
soldiers who were continually riding into their country,
alternately to intimidate them with thr~ats of extermination
and to wheedle them with promises of gifts and protection
--:al'ways in the name of a chief known variously as "President" and "Washington." .The Navaho heard much of this
chief in the parleys his fighting men were always so willing
to hold. A great believer in talk he seemed to be: treaties
were his solution for every trouble, with much big talk
about peace and friendship. That was probably because his
soldiers obviously did not know much about the country or
about Indian fighting, or because Big Chief Washington was
afraid to lead his own war parties against the powerful,
swift-riding Navaho~ These boastful, talkative Americans
were no more to be feared than the Mexicans who had been
living on the borders of the Navaho country for so many
years now, or than the faint-hearts known as Ptieblos~a
tribe of farmers at heart who were no match for fighting
men. None of the three was a. real menace to Navaho freedom, being rather a welcome annoyance, adding a fine thrill
to the roving, marauding life; and what a great life it was,
raiding the Pueblos and the Mexicans for livestock and
women, and parleying with the Americans for presents!
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Boom times were these for the Navaho, ending-as such
times do-with a crash that set their world to ringing.
EXIT SPAIN

New Mexico fell just short of three centuries under
Spanish rule. Francisco Vasquez Coronado, the explorer,
claimed the territory for Spain in 1540 and his priests at
once set about its Christianizing; Juan de Onate, the colonizer, began its settlement in 1598, and Diego de Vargas, the
conqueror, definitely established Spanish. sovereignty after
the bloody events of the Revolt of 1680. With the 19thcentury revolt charged the air again: in 1810 Mexico declared
its independence of Spain, and remote New Mexico had another master before it fully realized that such great changes
were even in the air. But the f,irst regime of independence in Mexico was not a successful affair, and it was
not until 1824 that our distant northern province began to
notice a sensible change in its fortunes. In that year it rose
to the dignity of statehood in a territorial merger which
included Chihuahua and Durango, with Chihuahua City the
capital of this splendid political creation. Durango, jealous
of Chihuah!1a, objected to the arrangement;so New Mexico'
was cast adrift as a territory later in the same year. In
.1836 came a new constitution for the Republic of Mexico,
and New Mexico was made a department in a sweeping political gesture wihch fixed neither eastern nor western limits
to its extent; and as such it continued until the American
occupation of 1846 came as the forecast of a permanent
change of sovereignty which was to offer the erstwhile forgotten province the honor of figuring again as a territory,
then as a state once more. New Mexico is the original "football of politics;" it has been everything, some things twice.
These changes of political stature and complexion
meant nothing to the free and belligerent little nation living in the rugged, barren country lying between the San
Juan and the Rio Grande rivers, on the northern borders
of Spanish America. The Navaho may have noticed that
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raiding was more profitable and less risky than it used, to
be, with their Mexican neighbors, deep in politics and the
, Americans creeping in over the Santa Fe Trail to add a new
element of uncertainty to the complexion of the times. At
any rate they were at their raiding best during this time of
political change. Bancroft the historian record,s a treaty
of peace with them in 1823" with trouble again in 1825
(comment enough on the durability of treaties!), and "continued hostility" in 1840-41.
L. Bradford Prince, another
chronicler of these turbulent years, tells us that Juan Bautista Vigil ( later the last of the Mexican governors of New
Mexico) made campaigns against the Navaho in 1823, 1833,
1836, and 1838, and summarizes the situation with the
words: "All through this period, down to the final overthrow of the Navtljoes long after the American occupation,
there existed an almost constant condition of warfare with
that powerful tribe." The Navaho had boasted that they let
the Mexicans live on, only because of their usefulness as
shepherds to the tribe, and the taunt seems scarcely to have
been an exaggeration of their power. New Mexico was
under their thumb, and they bore down where and when it
pleased them. But events were shaping themselves to
relieve the pressure.
'
THE UNITED STATES STEPS IN

General, Stephen W. Kearny occupied Santa Fe with
American troops in August, 1846, as one of the strategic
moves of the Mexican War. He learned quickly enough that
his problems of conquest and pacification included an enemy
within an enemy, for later in the same year he instructed
Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan, already on his way to
occupy Chihuahua, to give some attention to the Navaho
situation. Major William Gilpin of Doniphan's command
accordingly led two hundred men marching up the Chama
valley, down the San Juan river and up the Little Colorado,
cautiously circling the Navaho territory in, a maneuver
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that must have proved surprising to its occupants. Doniphan with his main force went meanwhile to Albuquerque,
down the Rio Grande to the mouth of the Rio Puerco, and
up that stream to Ojo del Oso, where New Fort Wingate
later stood. There the two forces joined and a treaty was
signed with a number of Navaho who had been gathered in
for the occasion. The treaty did little beyond forming an
acquaintance between American and Navaho which was
destined never to ripen into a beautiful friendship, but one
incident of the negotiations is worthy of record. The Navaho were being gently rebuked for making war on the Mexicans, and one of their number replied that he could not
understand why they should not do what the Americans
themselves were doing! And Doniphan had to explain
rather lamely that he was fighting the Mexicans with one
,hand and protecting them with the other. As a cowboy
would say, it was a private scrap, not a free-for-all; but such
fine points were beyond the simple Indian.
Doniphan's treaty of 1846 aged rapidly, and to little
purpose, with Navaho raids more frequent than' ever; so in
1848 Colonel E. W. B. Newby replaced it with another, after
an "expedition" under his lead had plunged madly into the
Navaho deserts and come out almost without firing a shot.
In 1849 came Major John M. Washington who marched
from Jemez to Canon de Chelly, wh,ere ar"lasting peace" was
concluded with the Navaho thereabout. The latter turned
over some stolen property and captives, and agreed to make
a larger delivery at Jemez thirty days later. Washington
jogged on happily to Zulli, and upon his return to civilization he learned that the Navaho, instead of going in repentance to Jemez, had raided Santa Fe!
The "lasting peace" lasted almost two years : 1851
found Colonel E. V. Sumner leading 'the American army's
almost "annual" tour of the Navaho territory and giving his
followers an extra thrill by marching ten niiles into Canon
de Chelly, greatest of Navaho strongholds. As usual no
serious accidents marred the perfect enjoyment of the out-
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ing, and Sumner reported the Navaho "completely overawed." The Americans did gain an important tactical advantage from this junket, by establishing Fort Defiance-:first military post in the Navaho country-in 1851-52. This
bold gesture of a "great power" toward a petty hand~ul of
half-savages rather belied"its terrifying name until in 1854
a soldier of the garrison was killed (apparently by a Navaho) and the tribe was induced to apprehend and hang the
culprit in solemn assembly of the troops. It was later
learned that they had substituted a Mexican captive in the
role of honor of ~he occasion; yet people will say that the .
Indian has no sense of humor !
.
Fort Defiance had its dampening effect upon Navaho
activities for a time (aided by a judicious distribution of
goods to the spoiled tribe), but in 1857 a negro servant was
killed and warfare resumed its· desultory round. In 1860
the Navaho attacked Fort Defiance but were repulsed, and a
retaliatory sortie rather carried off the honors of the affair
by killing many of their horses and sheep. Again the Americans had scored a point-one that was to prove very useful
in later actions of the same sort. The Navaho, as usually
they did when they found themselves in a tight place, sued
for peace; diplomacy had become almost a recognized profession among them, and they understood its uses. It was
the year 1861, and Indian affairs were giving .way to graver
matters in the military mind. So the small war was concluded with a treaty while the larger one got under way on
the distant Potomac.
CARLETON AND CARSON

Fifteen years the American army had occupied New
Mexico, and the mythical Swiss navy could hardly have been
less effective. The Indians ran riot: Navaho on the northern frontier, Comanche and Kiowa on the eastern, Apache
to the south and west. Now came another menace: the Confederate invasion under General Sibley swept north through
the Rio Grande vaHey, captured Albuquerque and Santa Fe,
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and drove on toward Fort Union, nerve center of Federal
military strength for the whole Southwest. The hour was
at its darkest, the proverbial hour "just before the dawn."
The lowering skies cleared when the Confederates were
routed at Apache Canon; but day really broke for troubled
New Mexico when Brigadier General James H. Carleton
was appointed department commander. His first report to
the War Department shows him a man of action.:
Headquarters Department of New Mexico,
Santa Fe,N. M., September 30, 1862.
GENERAL: I have the honor to inform you that I relieved
General Canby in command of this department on the 18th
instant, and he left this city for Washington, D. C., four
days afterwards. I find that during the raid which was made
into this .Territory by some armed men from Texas, under
Brigadier General Sibley, of the army 'of the so-called Confederate States, the Indians, aware that the attention of our·
troops could not, for the time, be turned toward them, commenced robbing the inhabitants of their stock, and killed, in
various places, a great number of people; the Navajoes on
the western side, and the Mescalero Apaches on the eastern
side of the settlements, both committing these outrages at
the same time, and during the last year that has passed
have left the people greatly impoverished. Many farms and
settlements near Fort Stanton have been entirely abandoned.
To punish and control the Mescaleros, I have ordered
Fort Stanton to be reoccupied. That post is in the heart of
their country, and hitherto when troops occupied it those
Indians were at peace. I have sent Colonel Christopher
Carson [Kit Carson] with five companies of his regiment of
New Mexican volunteers, to Fort Stanton. One of these
companies, on foot, will hold the post and guard the stores,
while four companies mounted, under Carson, will operate
against the Indians until they have been- punished for their
recent aggressions. The lieutenant colon~l, with four companies of the same regiment, will move into the Navajo
country and establish and garrison a poston the Gallo,
which was selected by General Canby; it is called Fort Wingate. I shall endeavor to have this force, assisted by some
militia which have been called out by the governor of the
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Territory, perform such service among the Navajoes as' will
bring them to feel that they have been doing wrong.
. ..
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JAMES H. CARLETON,

.

Brigadier General, Commanding.

Brigadier General· Lorenzo Thomas,
Adjutant General, U. S. A., Washington, D.C.
Carleton's method of bringing the marauding Indians
to feel that they had been "doing wrong" is. stated with his
characteristic simple vigor in his instructions to his righthand man, Kit Carson, dated at Santa Fe, October 12, 1862:
All. Indian men of that tribe [Mescalero] are to be
killed wherever and whenever you can find them. The
women and children will not be harmed, but. you will take
them prisoners, and feed 'them at Fort Stanton until you.
receive other instructions about them. If the Indians send
in a flag and desire to treat for peace, say to the bearer that
when the people of New Mexico were attacked by the Texans, the. Mescaleros broke their treaty of peace, and murdered innocent'people, and ran off their stock; that now our
hands are untied, and you have been sent to punish them for
their treachery and their crimes; that you have no power to·
make peace; that you are there :to kilJ them wherever you
can find them; that if they beg for peace; their chiefs
and twenty of their principal men· must come to Santa Fe
to have a talk here; but tell them fairly and frankly that you
will keep after their people and slay them until you receive
orders to desist from these headquarters; that this making
of treaties for them to break whenever they have an interest in breaking them will not be done any more; that that
time has passed by; that we have no faith in their promises;
that we believe if we kill some of their men in fair, open
war, they will be apt to remember that it will be better for'
them to remain at peace than to be at war. I trust that this
severity, in the long run, will be the most humane course
that could be pursued toward these Indians.
There were rumors of another Texas raid, and it was
no time for half measures. Treaties, moreover, had lost
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their novelty-and the new department commander was no
treaty-maker in any event. Twenty-five ,years of service as
an army officer on the western frontiers had taught him a
number of things about Indians. He knew that the Navaho
in particular had been spoiled by. too many treaties, too
much empty talk and hollow threatening. They had a lesson coming-a lesson long, delayed by the, timidity or the
ignorance of Carleton's predecessors in office-and he (with
Kit Carson's expert help) would see that they learned it
well. There was no thought o( revenge, no impulse of
cruelt~, in either mind. These two men had the' hard commonsense to draw the inevitable conclusions of their long
experience with Indians. They fully understood the evil,
they knew the only remedy; and with the cold precision of
surgeons they went to work.
"
Carleton's view of the situation is well stated in his
letter of Septerriber 6, 1863" to the adjutant general at
Washington:
The purpose now is never to relax the application of
force with a people that can no more be trusted than you
can trust the wolves that run through their mountains; to
gather them together, little by little, on to a reservation,
away from the haunts, and hills, and hiding places of their
country; and then to be kind to them; there teach their children how to read and write; teach them the arts of peace;
teach them the truths of Christianity.
And then? This frontier Indian fighter who has been
accused of ruthless cruelty in the handling of ,his difficult
problem, continues in a vein of surprising idealism:
Soon they will acquire new habits, new ideas, new
modes of life; the old Indians will die off, and carry with
them all latent longings for murdering and robbing; the
young ones will take their places without these longings;
and thus, little by little, they will become a happy and contented people, and Navajo wars will be remembered only
as something that belongs entirely to the past.
,
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THE NAVAHO ROUND-UP

The outcome of an expedition led by a Carson and
by a Carleton could never for a moment have been
in doubt. By February 1, 1863, the general was able to
report to Washington that the Mescaleros were completely
subdued: "lhave now three hundred and fifty of that tribe
at Fort Sumner and en route thither. These comprise all
that are left of those Indians, except a few who have either
run off into Mexico or joined the Gila Apaches. I shall try
to settle what have come in on a reservation near Fort Stanton, and have them plant fields for their subsistence the coming year."
The reduction of the Mescaleros was but one' phase of
the task Carleton had set himself and chosen the famous
scout to conduct in person. The Navaho offered a harder
problem, for their territory was larger and more difficult to
invade, while the tribe was well provided with iivestock for
food, clothing, and transport, and could make a long resistance.
Elaborate preparations were made for the Navaho campaign, scheduled to begin July 1, 1863. Fort Stanton was
reoccupied, Fort Craig strengthened, Fort Wingate and
Fort Sumner established. Fort Wingate was garrisoned by
four companies (some 300 men), of the First California Infantry Volunteers, who were to have "at least two companies in the field all the time." Carson was ordered into the
Navaho country with his regiment of First New Mexico Volunteers, his total force being twenty-seven officers and 709
men, of whom 206 were unmounted according to Sabin. A
new military post, Fort Canby (near present-day Ganado,
Arizona) was to be his headquarters, and there large stores
of military supplies were gathered.
The orders for the Navaho campaign were identical
with those guiding the Mescalero operations which preluded
it, except that the Navaho were given until July 20, to surrender themselves and join the captive Mescaleros at Fort
Sumner. After'that date all men capable of bearing arms
~lirected
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were to be killed, all women and children held as captives;
crops were to be destroyed, livestock either taken for military use or killed. A bounty of one dollar for each sheep
and twenty dollars for every sound horse and mule stimu.lated Carson's volunteers to look sharp and sweep clean.
Garrison commanders throughout the department of New
Mexico were ordered to scour their respective territories for
Navaho and Apache bands, for it was soon seen that the
round-up was scattering the Indians far and wide. The
commander at Fort Wingate was instructed to destroy all
crops within a radius of seventy miles of his post. And so
throughout the summer and fall of 1863 the whole military
resources of New Mexico were bent to the task of making
either a corpse or a prisoner of every Navaho then living.
The Utes joined the hunt for their own personal reasons and
profit; and so many citizens of New Mexico went Navahohunting that the governor had to call them off by proclamation in May, 1864.
Carson marched his command directly to the Pueblo
Colorado, where Carleton had ordered him to establish Fort
Canby. The post established, he left it with a. garrison
force and himself took the field. His reports tell of a series
of "scouts" throughout the late summer and fall of 1863.
Wherever Navaho might be, there rode Carson and his men,
covering the whole broad sweep of desert country lying between the Little Colorado and Canon de Chelly. Zuni and
the Hopi villages lay within the area and Carson visited
them both. Each had been suspected of aiding the Navaho, so the colonel deliberately made them take the role of
enemies of that tribe by sending out warriors with his scouting parties. He gave them fair warning that aid to the foe
would bring. destruction of their villages; this Carleton had
solemnly promised the Zuni, "as sure as the sQn shines."
The Ute had declared themselves long since, and were hap, pily applying the Carleton policy to their traditional enemies. A very good policy they found it, except that .Carson
(on orders from Carleton, and against his own judgment)
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would not let them keep captives they took, for use as slaves
or for sale to the Mexicans. They might keep livestock,
however, and Carson noticed that their interest in the campaign languished when they had accumulated all the animals they could well manage. Like the Navaho, they were
accustomed to fight only for plunder; but they made efficient
scouts and spies, and Carson complimented them highly in
his returns from the field.
Chasing small parties of fugitives, capturing livestock,
destroying crops, Carson rode up and down the western
frontier of· the Navaho. He fought no pitched battles,
stormed no fortresses, and the work seemed a costly effort
from which little good was coming. Carleton encouraged
him: "As winter approaches you will have better luck." He
could be -patient as well as fiery; and small bands of Navaho
were already coming in voluntarily, destitute and halfstarved.
Winter came, with heavy falls of snow to drive the
fugitives down from their mountain retreats, and the general back in Santa Fe urged a move long planned-the invasion of Canon de Chelly, where the Navaho had always
_ felt themselves secure. Soon January 6, 1864, Carson with
fourteen officers and 375 men moved upon this tremendous
. fissure of red sandstone, into which previous expeditions
against the Navaho h;:td glanced timorously and then retreated in haste, lest its sheer walls prove a death trap. He
did not enter it at once (Carson had learned years ago that
he who takes fewest chances lives longest, in frontier warfare) but divided his forces into two parties and sent one
along each rim of the chasm to reconnoiter thedepths below.
The plan was to join a third detachment, Company H of the
First Cavalry, New Mexico Volunteers, under Capt. Albert
H. Pfeiffer, which had been sent direct from Canby to reconnoiter the eastern opening of the eastern branch (now called
Canon del Muerto) of the canon. The parties on either rim :
advanced to within sight of the eastern mouth, but no sign
of Pfeiffer's party was seen. Puzzled, Carson turned back
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to his camp, arid there was the missing contingent! . They
had traversed Canon del Muerto from east to west, a distance of some thirty miles, with Indians harrying them
constantly from above, and ·ice on the stream in the Canon
bottom making progress painfully slow. Not a man was
lost, however, for the very height of the canon walls-more
than a thousand feet for much of the distance-kept the
enemy from doing any severe damage. It was a bold move,
nevertheless, for the Navaho might have hemmed them in
or laid a successful ambush in the little-known depths of the
great chasm. Pfeiffer knew neither their strength nor the
character of their stronghold when he plunged into it and
staked all on his ability to win through.
COIllpany H had found few Indians on its march-but
might there not be more fugitives in the south branch? Captain Asa B. Carey took the company a~d marched through
Cannon de Chelly from the west, while Carson and the com,..
mand waited shivering in the base camp. Carey had less
trouble and better fortune than Pfeiffer, for a large group
of Navaho surrendered to him without a struggle, and "that
night I counted 150 full-grown Indians in my camp, besides
many children," he says in his report.
The canon invasion determined the success of the
round-up. Even the ricos, the wealthy stock owners of the
trib~ who thought they could retire with their herds to the
lofty Chusca Mountains and escape American capture, saw
that their enemy would go anywhere to get them, while the
humbler tribesmen beheld their last refuge taken away. To
all the dread truth came plainly home, that nowhere· on
earth could they hide themselves away from Kit Carson's
men. "We have shown the Indians that in no place, however formidable or inaccessible in their opinion, are they
safe from the pursuit· of the troops of this command; and
have convinced a large portion of them that the struggle on
their part is a hopeless one," Carson wrote to his commander on January 23, 1864. Death, capture, starvation,
surrender: those were the alternatives. Most of the tribe

,
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chose surrender, and all through the spring of 1864 Forts
Canby, Defiance and Wingate, did a thriving business in
Navaho prisoners en route, via Los Pinos on the Rio Grande,
for the new home of the tribe at the Bosque Redondo, near
Fort Sumner on the Pecos. A count made the next year
showed a total of 8,491 Navaho assembled there in the distant Mescalero country.
Fort Canby was abandoned in August of 1864. The
troops were sent into Arizona on. an Apache campaign, Carson going to the Bosque Redondo for a time, later on' a sue- .
cessful expedition against the allied Comanche and Kiowa
on the western plains. Pressure on the Navaho was continued, relentlessly, however, and in March of 1865 Carleton was informed by a "chief" who had been sent back from
the Bosque to persuade others to surrender that only six
small bands were left. Largest of these was that of Manuelito, sometimes called the "last great chief of the Navahos," comprising about one hundred persons in very poor
shape. But these few die-hards caused little trouble; the
Navaho as a free people had ceased to exist.
Carleton and Carson had 'performed a highly successful
operation, removing the offending organ bodily and with
scant loss of blood, for the casualties on either side were not
high. But would the patient recover and return to normal
health? That problem, unhappily, could not be solved by
their special type of skill. In truth, their work was done.
Carleton had charge of the Navaho throughout their captivity, it is true, but his military mind like his military
machine proved utterly unadapted to the problem that now
arose: a problem in psychology, in sociology, in economics,
in government. It was doomed to failure; not only for
being imperfectly understood and grossly mishandled, but,
for resting on the old false premise that the red man can be
made like the white man. So ,the great human drama of
Bosque Redondo moves into its second act, of which the
scene is laid in a vast, barren valley which ten thousand unskilled and unwilling hands are expected, somehow, to transform into a farm.

\
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BOSQUE REDONDO

The Bosque Redondo-part of a reservation forty miles
square, with Fort Sumner in its center-proved no Promised Land, and the "children" who were forcibly led forth
from their wilderness to people it clamored unceasingly to
be led back again. In its new home the transplanted tribe
found itself sharing the bottom-lands of a broad bend in the
Pecos river with some four hundred Mescalero Apache who
were there first and considered the place rightfully their
own. It was Carleton's plan to develop farming in the
irrigable portions (estimated at six thousant acres) of the
locality and make both tribes self-supporting, contented and
peaceful tillers of the soil. The Navaho were accordingly
set to. work at digging ditches ·and breaking ground for
planting. The work did not please the formerly free-roving Indian; neither did its monotonous, unmilitary character appeal to the soldier in charge of this curiously socialistic experiment in civilization by fiat of military government. It required no Delphian oracle to foretell that matters would not run smoothly in the new colony, but only a
daring imagination could have conjured up all the miseries
and disappointments that actually came to pass.
Man and nature seemed in league from the outset to
defeat Carleton's solution of the Navaho problem. Man's
part was a feud of increasing bitterness between the civil
and military authorities of the federal government-between Matthew Steck, superintendent of Indian affairs in
New Mexico under the department of the interior, and General Carleton, niilitary commander of the territory. Carleton, having by military tactics provided the hungry mouths
to feed, expected Steck to help with the feeding. The military were fighters, not Indian guardians, was his attitude:
he had carried his campaign to a successful end and spoiled
the Navaho for war; now let the Indian service foster their
career in the arts of peace. Steck, however, saw matters
differently.
He had never· favored the removal of the
Navaho from their homeland (although he did believe in
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the reservation-and-concentration policy) and he had no
appropriation, no provision of any' sort, for assuming the
sudden burden of eight thousand helpless, starving souls.
Carleton had started this mess, let him clean it up. Steck,
in short, sulked; and sulking, he campaigned so actively
against the Bosque plan that a controversy arose involving
the whole territory of New Mexico and the honor and
glory of the departments of war and interior at Washington,
until finally a special committee from congress journeyed to
the scene of dispute and took reams of testimony on whether'
the Indian service should be under one or the other' department, whether' Indian tribes should
packed about the
country like traveling minstrels or settled on reservations
in their own territory. All of which helped mightily to feed
and clothe the destitute Navaho.
. Carleton made heroic efforts to meet the 'situation and
his disgruntled soldiers worked like Trojans. Thirty miles
of irrigation ditch was dug, two thousand acres of land
ploughed and planted to wheat, corn, beans, by the season
of ~865. , But there can be no harvest with nature unfriendly: every crop planted in the years 1864 to 1867 was
a failure. Sometimes it was insects, again drought; or
again, a flood in the Pecos, or lashing winds or unseasonable
,cold. The land seemed cursed and all went wrong. The
water (slightly alkaline, even the most ardent pro-Bosqueists admitted) sickened men, killed livestock (the Indian
said) "and poison weeds killed more. Starvation and want
were never beyond sight, with rations habitually short and
unpalatable; for the Navaho found it hard to accustom
themselves to wheat flour, the staple of diet. Wood was
<iifficult to find (fancy a Navaho grubbing up mesquite
roots!), and the captives shivered tliTough bleak winters in
flimsy shelters of brush and canvas, while the Comanche
and Kiowa raided their dwindling flocks and herds.
Mescalero and Navaho never realized Carleton's fond
prophecy that the two, being racial cousins, would merge
into one people. They fought and bickered continually, and
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when the entire Mescalero contingent of nearly four hundred souls silently left the reservation one night in November, 1865, the Navaho were too hopeless to rejoice. They
got the Mescalero lands-but to what good, if nothing came
to harvest? In the spring of 1868, utterly discouraged and
demoralized, the Navaho planted almost nothing, determined at last to meet fate unresisting, (although their agent
suspected they were preparing a secret desertion). At last,
it was clear that the Bosque Redondo experiment had failed:
the Navaho would not become farmers and the government
would not maintain them in idleness.
The government gave in. Lieutenant General W. T.
Sherman and Colonel S. F. Tappan came out from Washington in May, 1868, as peace commissioners to negotiate with
the Navaho for their removal to a reservation in the old
tribal territory. Both parties were in a tractable mood
after so much suffering on the one side and so much costly
experimentation on the other, as General Sherman indicated
in the following letter to Senator John Sherman, his
brother:
Fort Union, New Mexico, June 11, 1868.
Dear Brother: I have now been in New Mexico three weeks
along with Colonel Tappan, peace commissioner, for the
purpose of seeing the Navahos, and making some permanent
disposition of them ...
We found 7,200 Indians there, seemingly abject and
disheartened. They have been there four years. The first
year they were maintained by the army at the cost of about
$700,000, and made a small crop. ,The second year the cost
was about $500,000, and the crop was small. Last year the
crop was an utter 'failure, though all the officers say they
labored hard and faithfully. This year they woul,d not
work because they said it was useless. The cost has been
diminished to about 12 cents per head a day, which for 7,000
Indians makes oyer $300,000, and this is as low as possible,
being only a pound of corn, and a pound of beef with a little
salt per day.
Now this' was the state of facts, and we could see no
time in the future when this could be amended. The scarcity
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of wood, the foul character of water; which is salty and full
of alkali, and their utter despair, made it certain that we
would have to move them or they would scatter and be a
perfect nuisance. So of course we concluded to move them.
After de.bating all the country at our option, we have chosen
a small part of their old country, which is as far out of the
way of the whites and of our future probable wants as possible, and have agreed to move them there forthwith, and
have made a treaty which will save the heavy cost of maintenance and give as much probability of their resuming
their habits of industry as the case admits of ; .. .
So on June 1, 1868, another Navaho treaty took its place
in the long series. This one, however, thanks to the severity of Carleton and Carson, was to be more than a scrap of
paper. It was drawn to encourage farming (for the men
must be kept busy somehow), with free. implements and
seeds, a tract of land (not over 160 acres) to each head of
a family wanting it, and a small clothing allowance yearly
r
for ten years. It provided for schools as needed, one for
every thirty prospective pupils. Fifteen thousand sheep
and goats were to be bought for the tribe; and they were
urgently needed, for the Navaho agent in 1868 estimated
that. the exiles upon returning to their old home had only
1,550 horses, 940 sheep, and 1,025 goats; less than half an
anfmal for every person, if we take the agent's estimate of
the population at 8,000 souls.
The conquered Navaho set forth from the Bosque on
June 18, 1868, and on November 1 of that year Agent Dodd
at New Fort Wingate formally assumed charge of "7,111
Navajo Indians, viz~; 2,157 under 12 years of age, 2,696
women, 2,060 men, and 201 age and sex unknown." The
Navaho were home again, a sadder and a wiser tribe.
AFTER-EFFECTS

. The effects of this violent and complete disruption of
Navaho life are beyond calculation. As long as a Navaho
remains upon the earth the epilogue of lJosque Redondo will
be still in the playing, for this episode of five years duration
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turned the stream of, tribal history into a new channel for
all time to come.
Bosque Redondo was a military conquest, and very
much more: it was the utter subjugation of as free a people
as could be found anywhere within or upon the horizons of
civilization. No mere change of political sovereignty was at
stake as in the wars between western nations, no transfer
of nominal allegiance from one state to another, with only
a brief disruption of the accustomed routine of living.
Bosque ,Redondo was a moral holocaust, as devastating to
Navaho civilization as were' the barbarian invasions of the
Dark Ages to ours. It destroyed their material prosperity,
-but that was soon recovered. it abolished their freedom,
-but even that was of less consequence than its greatest
result, which was a silent, inner transformation: the destruction of this remarkable people's morale, of its audacious, unbounded confidence in itself. The transformation
is epitomized in the spectacle of a nation of barbarian
nomads accustomed to ride far and free, fearing nothing on
earth and hearkening to no lesser voices than those of the
tribal gods, meekly shouldering the hoe at the beck qf an
alien master. To most Indian tribes civilization has come in
assimilable'draft. To the Navaho it came as a rushing
flood, tumbling their whole world topsy-turvy. From a freedom almost idyllic they were plunged into a perpetual semiservitude, in just five years.
But we must not over-sentimentalize the effects of
Bosque Redondo, for two strongly corrective facts are beyond question established. The first is that the Navaho
merited heavy punishm~nt for their cynical disregard of the
lives and property of their neighbors, Pueblo and Spanish;
and five years of bitter exile is not an inhuman retribution
for two centuries of rapine and murder. The second is that
the Navaho deliberately threw themselves in the pathway
of a relentless force, the westward march of European civilization, and came off very well in the end. No longer free,
they are a nation still: larger, wealthier, more secure, than
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ever before. They have weathered a crisis that proved fatal
to many a tribe-that of final adjustment to the conquering
American. If that inevitable clash was a brutal shock, Navaho arrogance must be held equally responsible with American rigor. Both parties may with reason deplore the event
and rejoice at the outcome; for here, as so often elsewhere,
history is justifying at its leisure an act of seemingly intemperate haste and severity.
NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHY.-H. H. Bancroft; Arizona and New
Mexico, L. Bradford Prince: Historf:cal Sketches of New Mexico, and
R. E. Twitchell: Leading Facts of New Mexican History and Military
Occupation of ,New Mexico, were principally used for the Indian
troubles of the first half of the 19th century.
For the campaign of conquest and conditions at the Bosque Redondo, the following official sources afforded most of the information:
Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian AfJai1·s, 1863-69;
Report of the Joint Special Committee on the Condition of the Indian
Tribes, 1867; and the field reports of Carson, Carey and Pfeiffer, as
published in Edwin L. Sabin: Kit Carson Days.
Carleton's correspondence, of which excerpts are quoted, is published in the Joint Special Committee Report. The Sherman quotation
is from Rachel Sherman Thorndike (editor): The Sherman Letters.
Goo~ popular accounts of this episode in Navaho history are available in Sabin, above cited, and J. P. Dunn, Jr.: Massacres of the
Mountains.
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